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Abstract: The debate about the roles of general and specific abilities in predicting important outcomes
is a tempest in a ladle because we cannot measure abilities without also measuring skills. Skills always
develop through exposure, are specific rather than general, and are executed using different strategies
by different people, thus tapping into varied specific abilities. Relative predictive validities of
measurement formats depend on the purpose: the more general and long-term the purpose, the better
the more general measure. The more specific and immediate the purpose, the better the closely
related specific measure.
Keywords: general cognitive ability; specific cognitive abilities; academic achievement; job performance;
occupational attainment; health; longevity; situational specificity
Excitabat enim fluctus in simpulo ut dicitur Gratidius.
For Gratidius raised a tempest in a ladle.
—Cicero, First century BCE, De Legisbus
In 2009, the Journal of Research in Personality published a Special Issue assessing the past and
future of the famous person-situation debate in personality psychology. The issue, incorporating
81 personality psychologists as authors, included the usual editorial introduction, 38 empirical studies
and evaluative essays, and a concluding perspective by Walter Mischel, whose 1968 book [1] is often
considered to have originated the debate. One of the essays stood out as having assessed the question’s
status most clearly, at least for me. It was the single-pager by Robert Hogan [2], who offered four
reasons why the debate is ‘much ado about nothing’. His bottom line was that no one knows how to
measure situations and everyone agrees that what a situation even ‘is’ depends on the perceptions of
the people in them. However, these perceptions are always functions of those people’s personalities,
so any situation definition would be affected by the very factors ‘theory’ says they influence.
I perceive the ‘situation’ of debate about the roles of general and specific abilities in predicting
important outcomes to be a similar waste of time and resources. Of course this may be just an expression
of my cranky personality—you can be the judge of that after I outline my reasons. Like Hogan’s, they do
not constitute any kind of formal review, nor are they based on having run all the statistical tests that
could be run. They are based, though, on reading a large share of the relevant research, doing many
relevant statistical tests, and thinking hard about what we have done, what we can do with what we
have, what might be missing, and what we could do to remedy that. At minimum, it is thus a dust-bowl
empirically-based abstraction of an abstraction, and maybe a layer or two up from that.
There is massive confusion throughout the cognitive abilities research literature and assessment
communities over which tasks measure skills and which measure abilities. I use ‘skill’ here to refer to
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performance clearly acquired through exposure and practice, and ‘ability’ to refer to some inherent
capacity to acquire skills in general or particular kinds of skills, a distinction much easier to postulate
than to articulate either conceptually or empirically with any clarity. This confusion is understandable
because, much as we would like to, we have no assessments that measure purely either ability or
skill, probably because there are no, and never could be, such tasks. All purported ability measures,
especially those most often claimed otherwise such as the Raven, as evidenced by their large Flynn
Effects, tap exposure and practice too, as can be seen by the substantial practice effects that show
up just by administering the same test twice, as well as responses to task training. All purported
skill measures such as typing or arithmetic tests also tap ability because even when exposure and
opportunity to practice are closely controlled, individual differences in performance emerge. However,
the primary reason there probably never could be such tasks is that babies can do almost nothing
we recognize as cognitive—everything of that sort emerges through exposure and experience during
‘development’. It is not just a matter of someday identifying the relevant raw ‘biological’ material
either: the brain is actively sculpted by experience, and genes all have environmentally mediated
reaction norms.
Importantly, individual cognitive differences are often strategy-related, e.g., [3,4]. That is, people
differ in the ways they do the same tasks, with some strategies being more effective than others. Part of
any concept of general ability is the ability to figure out effective and efficient ways of approaching
new tasks, so these differences do reflect this general ability. General ability is more than this, though:
even when people are taught or told to use specific strategies and given the opportunity to practice
before being tested, individual differences in performance remain [5]. This likely indicates differences
in some kind of overall implementation capacity, but also indicates differences in which strategies
‘come easiest’ or ‘work best’, reflecting differences in what would be considered more specific abilities,
as well as differences in prior exposure to relevant material.
The editors’ call for articles for this Special Issue of the Journal of Intelligence on what they term
‘the great debate’ about the relative merits of general and specific abilities in predicting real-world
outcomes premised the debate on a consensus among researchers and practitioners that the ‘structure’
of human cognitive abilities can be modeled as a hierarchy consisting of a general ability factor that is
associated with various levels of increasingly specific, more narrowly construed abilities. They noted
appropriately, however, that this is about as far as any ‘consensus’ goes. Opinions differ as to just
how the various ‘levels’ are related to each other, just what they might mean ‘biologically’, and how
best to study them. In addition, every time anyone constructs a hierarchical model in a new battery,
it comes out looking different from any one that the same person constructed in any other battery,
not to mention different from the model some other researcher would construct in that same battery in
that same sample. This is because the underlying factor-analytically-based methods are inherently
subjective and because the relative associations among specific cognitive tasks vary both with sample
specifics and with the specific other cognitive tasks in any battery.
Carroll [6] offered what I hope is the ultimate example of this variation. Try as he might across
more than 460 datasets, he could not clearly carve out the natural ‘joints’ among specific abilities, nor
even how many ‘levels’ of them there might be. My own work with the VPR model [7–11] shows this
too: the specifics of the VPR model in each battery were different from every other one. This does not
undermine the point of all that work, which was not to be specific about defining VPR model factors or
specific abilities—the various verbal–perceptual and fluid-crystallized models all showed analogous
differences. Rather, the point was to compare those two modeling perspectives and thus the relevance
of their underlying structural premises. There, results were highly consistent, with the VPR model
always fitting better. However, neither model ‘carved nature at its joints’ in any battery any better than
Carroll had. This is because factor analysis spits back at us only what we put into it, and we have no
tasks that uniquely measure any one particular ability or skill (see above).
At the same time, there is no question that we can design tasks that assess relatively specific,
more narrowly construed abilities/skills. There is also no question that, if we have a good broad
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range of these, we can build yet another hierarchical model, extract its g factor in some nice broad
sample, and this g factor will predict all kinds of important life outcomes from academic achievement
to occupational attainment to longevity. Our model will also have a number of more specific factors,
and none of them alone will ‘outshine’ the g factor in predicting life outcomes, as long as we keep
those life outcomes rather broad. However, if we make the outcomes rather specific, and especially
if we make them rather immediate, then those more specific abilities will predict the outcomes too,
even after controlling the g factor, to the extent that the outcomes have content related to the assessed
tasks and the outcomes are soon. Schmidt, Hunter, and Caplan [12] noted long ago that we had better
also adjust for measurement error in all factors. Of course they were right, because we want to know
about the predictive powers of whatever abilities/skills we are measuring, not those of the scores on
whatever tasks we happened to dream up to assess them; so we do that too, and the more specific
factors will still predict the outcomes, to the extent noted.
The bottom line for outcome predictors and selection practitioners is straightforward: if you
want to predict a rather specific outcome happening rather soon, such as next year’s school grades
in a specific subject, or seek an employee who can perform productively tomorrow or at least this
week, assess specific content/job-related tasks. However, if you are going for long-term prediction
and, on the job, are prepared to invest in training and offer incentives that will be needed to keep the
employee around to make good on that investment, go for general cognitive ability. For your purposes,
you can leave the question of to what degree you just assessed accrued cognitive skills and/or some
kind of inherent capacity to the researchers. That one is rather thorny and inevitably developmental
rather than merely structural, but the debate over the relative importance of general and specific
abilities in predicting important life outcomes is a tempest in a ladle that has run its course.
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